What condition occurs when our behaviors are inconsistent with our beliefs?

Attitude Change Following Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is often considered to be one of the most influential theories in social psychology. According to the theory, inconsistency between attitude and behavior produces an unpleasant emotional state called ‘cognitive dissonance,’ and people try to reduce this undesired state by changing their attitudes. For example, after students wrote a favorable essay about a tuition increase, their attitudes toward the tuition increase tended to become more positive (Steele, Southwick, & Critchlow, 1981). Thus, students change their attitudes in order to reduce cognitive inconsistency between their attitudes (‘I don’t like the idea of a tuition increase’) and behaviors (‘I wrote an essay supporting it’). In other words, they rationalize the action they took by changing their attitudes.

van Veen, Krug, Schooler, and Carter (2009) investigated the neural mechanisms underlying such attitude change processes, using an experimental paradigm called induced compliance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). While inside an fMRI scanner, participants were asked to tell yet-to-be-tested participants outside the room that they enjoyed performing the boring task in the uncomfortable scanner environment. In one condition, participants were given a monetary incentive to do this, but there was no such incentive provided in the other condition. This monetary incentive was intended to prevent cognitive dissonance by giving the participant external justification for behavior that was inconsistent with his or her beliefs (saying that the task was enjoyable when it was not). On the other hand, the condition with no monetary incentive was meant to cause a discrepancy between belief and behavior, thus inducing cognitive dissonance in the subjects.

When participants were expressing counterattitudinal opinions without sufficient justification, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) (see Figure 2(a)) and anterior insula were activated (van Veen et al., 2009), among other regions. Research has previously associated these regions with negative emotions (Shackman et al., 2011) and subjective awareness of feelings (Craig, 2009), respectively, and thus the findings were consistent with the notion that cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable emotional state. Furthermore, across participants, the dACC activation was significantly positively correlated with participants’ final attitudes toward the scanner environment and the boring task, but only in the cognitive dissonance condition in which participants received no monetary incentive for expressing counterattitudinal opinions. The higher the dACC activation in this condition, the more favorable the participant’s attitudes were to the task and fMRI environment.

Several subsequent fMRI studies have investigated the neural processes underlying dissonance-induced attitude change using a ‘free-choice’ paradigm (Brehm, 1956). In a typical free-choice paradigm, participants are first asked to rate (or rank) several items according to their preferences (first rating task). Then, they are asked to make choices between pairs of items that have similar preference ratings, as determined by the first rating task (choice task). Finally, they are asked to rate all of the items again (second rating task). When participants are forced to make a choice between two equally attractive items, any negative attitudes associated with the chosen item and/or any positive attitudes associated with the rejected item induce cognitive dissonance. Typically, to reduce dissonance, the participant’s preference for the rejected item decreases and his preference for the chosen item increases, a preference change pattern called the ‘spreading of alternatives.’ It should be noted, however, that a methodological problem in the free-choice paradigm has been pointed out (Chen & Risen, 2010; see also Izuma & Murayama, 2013). The attitude change observed in the typical free-choice paradigm could simply be due to a methodological artifact.

Nonetheless, using a new free-choice paradigm that addresses the problem, Izuma et al. (2010) found pMFC involvement in cognitive dissonance. In their study, the degree of cognitive dissonance was quantified on a trial-by-trial basis during the second rating task, as indicated by the discrepancy between the participant’s preference for each item and his or her past choice behaviors (chosen or rejected). For example, for the items rejected during the choice task, higher item preferences were associated with more dissonance because the act of rejecting the item posed a greater contradiction. Similarly, for the chosen items, lower item preferences were associated with more dissonance. Using an index that quantifies cognitive dissonance, they found that certain areas within the pMFC, namely the dACC and dmPFC (see Figure 2(b)), tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis (Izuma et al., 2010). Like van Veen et al. (2009), they also found anterior insula activation, but only when the statistical threshold was lowered. Among other regions, the DLPFC (see Figure 1(c)), which is implicated in cognitive control (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000), was also associated with cognitive dissonance.

Previous studies using EEG have also demonstrated that the DPLFC, especially on the left side, plays a key role in dissonance reduction processes (Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008). Left DLPFC activity was higher when participants were writing a counterattitudinal essay without sufficient justification, as compared to the condition in which sufficient justification was provided (and thus there was much less cognitive dissonance) (Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, et al., 2008). Furthermore, another study demonstrated that, when participants are allowed to monitor their own left DLPFC activity, as measured by EEG, and trained to suppress it, their dissonance-induced attitude changes are significantly reduced, suggesting a causal role for left DLPFC activity in dissonance reduction (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, et al., 2008).

Although both van Veen et al. (2009) and Izuma et al. (2010) commonly found pMFC activation in response to cognitive dissonance, the two studies report somewhat different activations in other areas. Notably, van Veen found reliable anterior insula activations, but relatively small DPLFC activations. On the other hand, Izuma reported extensive bilateral DLPFC activations, but anterior insula activation was found only after lowering the statistical threshold. This difference between the two studies may be due to the difference between experimental paradigms (or timing of brain scans). In van Veen’s study, participants expressed their counterattitudinal opinions during the scanning, and therefore, the participants had no explicit opportunity to reduce their felt dissonance during this task. In contrast, in the Izuma study, during the second rating task, participants perceived the discrepancy between their preference and past choice behaviors, while rating their preference for each item again. Thus, they had an opportunity to reduce cognitive dissonance by reporting their new preference. Taken together, results from these fMRI and EEG studies suggest that, although the dACC plays a key role in both representing and reducing cognitive dissonance, the anterior insula may be more related to passive emotional reactions to cognitive dissonance (dissonance representation), and the DLPFC may play a role only in the active dissonance reduction process following dissonance perception.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Dissonance-based interventions (DBIs) were developed based on Festinger’s well-known cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance theory postulates that an underlying psychological tension is created when an individual’s behavior is inconsistent with his or her thoughts and beliefs. This underlying tension then motivates an individual to make an attitude change that would produce consistency between thoughts and behaviors. Research has shown that when an individual engages in behaviors that are inconsistent with their attitude or belief (e.g., arguing a counter-attitudinal position on a topic), a change in attitude is produced that is consistent in the direction of his or her behavior. This mechanism of thought or attitude change is the same mechanism used to produce changes in negative, irrational thoughts that are involved in the maintenance of depression and related disorders.

DBIs aim to induce cognitive dissonance by having individuals voluntarily take a stance against the Western ideal of beauty. These acts should create dissonance within individuals because it is assumed that most individuals previously held beliefs that were consistent with the cultural standards of beauty (i.e., extreme thinness or muscularity). Thus, by arguing against the cultural ideals of beauty, individuals should reduce their internalization of these ideals. So far, studies of the effectiveness of DBIs have only been conducted with women regarding the internalization of the thin ideal. Two prominent DBIs include The Body Project and Reflections: Body Image Program, with the latter a sorority-run initiative.

1.2 Dissonance Revolution

Our discussion starts with cognitive dissonance—one of the most prominent topics in social psychology. The central thesis of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is that when two beliefs are inconsistent, individuals experience negatively arousing cognitive conflict (called dissonance). Because the dissonance is aversive, the individuals try to reduce it by changing one or the other beliefs. For example, when making a difficult decision, individuals show attitude change that justifies the decision. In this case, individuals who face such a decision are conflicted because not all beliefs are consistent with the decision. For example, they may have beliefs favoring the option that is rejected. The individuals are therefore motivated to reduce the conflict by justifying the decision they have made. The justification is typically achieved by changing their attitudes and beliefs so that the new attitudes and beliefs are consistent with and justify the decision that has been made. Notably, the resulting attitude change can be long lasting (Sharot, Fleming, Yu, Koster, & Dolan, 2012). By nature, then, we may be rationalizing beings, ready to justify what we have done after the fact.

Dissonance theory revolutionized social psychology by emphasizing the role of cognition in social behavior. More importantly, it also provided the first testable framework in which to conceptualize how cognition could be motivated and how the motivated cognition could yield some intriguing forms of social behavior. The theory enabled us, both in and outside of social psychology, to reflect on potentially unflattering aspects of the human mind. Indeed, the influence of dissonance theory went far beyond the field of social psychology. The term dissonance has since become incorporated into the English vernacular.

3.2 Cognitive Consistency

The number of variations within this approach to self-evaluation regulation is also substantial. An example of this approach is cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957). According to dissonance theory, self-esteem is threatened by inconsistency. Holding beliefs that are logically or ‘psychologically’ inconsistent, i.e., dissonant, with one another is uncomfortable. For example, suppose a student agrees to a request to write an essay in favor of a tuition increase at her school. Her knowledge that she is opposed to a tuition increase is dissonant with her knowledge that she agreed to write an essay in favor of a tuition increase. One way to reduce this threatening dissonance is for the student to change her attitude to be more in favor of a tuition increase.

Note that social comparison mechanisms and consistency reduction mechanisms are both self-enhancement strategies, yet they seem to have little in common. Threat from dissonance rarely has anything to do with the performance of another, i.e., social comparison. Similarly, inconsistency is generally irrelevant to an SEM threat, whereas other's performance is crucial. Attitude change is the usual mode of dissonance threat reduction; on the other hand, changes in closeness, performance, or relevance are the SEM modes.

Dissonance: Persuasion from Behavior

Leon Festinger was the first to describe cognitive dissonance, which provides a striking example of how our own behaviors can lead to attitude change. According to cognitive dissonance theory, any two thoughts that are related to each other can either be consonant or dissonant. Dissonant cognitions occur when one thought does not follow from or fit with the other (e.g., I am an environmentalist; I drive an SUV) Holding two dissonant cognitions in the mind simultaneously leads to an aversive state of arousal that individuals are motivated to reduce. Dissonant cognitions often arise when an individual thinks about a past behavior and realizes that it was inconsistent with an attitude that he or she holds, such as holding a positive attitude towards safe sex, but failing to use a condom. Under these circumstances, as it is more difficult to change the behavior than to change the attitude, the most common way to resolve the inconsistency is to change the attitude to be in line with the behavior. While changing the attitude typically requires cognitive effort, the negative affective state associated with dissonance is a powerful motivator to engage in biased elaborative processing. The result of dissonance processes is that individuals persuade themselves to change their attitudes to be in line with their behaviors. In this way, the dissonance resulting from a failure to use condoms could most readily be resolved by changing the attitude to be more negative towards condoms.

A number of experimental paradigms have been used to illustrate dissonance in the laboratory, and these provide explanations for some surprising phenomena in persuasion. Dissonance explains what happens to people who agonize over a difficult decision, whether it is a simple purchase or a major life decision, and then after the decision express more positive views of the chosen option, and more negative views of the nonchosen option. This is referred to as the ‘spreading of alternatives,’ and it occurs because the negative attributes of the chosen option and the positive attributes of the option not chosen are dissonant with the behavior of the choice that was made. Another example of dissonance occurs when people who are humiliated during an initiation to join a group like a fraternity or the armed forces, end up liking these groups more than if there was no hazing. As going through humiliation to join a group is dissonant with any negative aspects of the group, the attitude toward the group is changed to be more positive. This is referred to as ‘effort justification’ because the attitude change results from having to justify to the self the willingness to go through so much to join the group. These are just two examples of the paradoxical consequences of dissonance for persuasion (see the dissonance entry for more in-depth discussion).

Dissonance Approaches

Prevention programs based on cognitive dissonance and the use of the Internet have been widely and successfully implemented among female college models, but their use has not yet filtered down to the school setting. Cognitive Dissonance Theory has generally been used with at-risk women, and outside of the school setting. This approach intersects nicely with models of interactive and student-centered learning as well as fitting with the principles of developing media literacy, making it a good fit for the school setting. The focus on public sharing of attitudes that contradict societal body standards could potentially be useful for all students, with and without body image problems, as it would assist in creating healthier peer norms that would extend the benefits of the program beyond the time in which it is presented. Trials among at-risk adolescent girls (17 years) outside the school setting have been effective and suggest that dissonance-based approaches could potentially be trialed in schools with older year levels (15 years and over), provided that teachers or facilitators were well trained in the use of this approach.

The Internet offers a broad range of opportunities for programs designed to improve body image in a range of populations and such approaches could potentially be broadly disseminated at very low cost, and with minimal teacher training, making them an exciting new possibility for school-based prevention. The use of the Internet offers the additional benefit of enabling both a universal and targeted program as initial activities can include screening for risk factors and tailoring the subsequent content. For example, ‘Student Bodies’ is an 8-week psycho-educational eating disorder prevention program that was developed in the United States and trialed among female adolescents (mean age 15.1 years) and their parents. It is recommended that future research investigate the use of cognitive dissonance and Internet-based approaches in schools.

Freedom, religion, and health behavior change

A number of psychological theories integrate the idea of freedom, or concepts closely akin, to encourage productive health behavior. The concept of choice is of course a critical feature of Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory. Inconsistent cognitions that result from freely chosen behavior are more likely to produce dissonance and subsequent efforts to restore perceptions of consonance. This idea has been productively applied to health behavior change interventions, from physical activity to smoking cessation (e.g., Chatzisarantis, Hagger, & Wang, 2008; Lando & Davison, 1975). The basic point is that if people put forth effort toward a productive health goal under conditions of high choice, they should come to endorse that health behavior more strongly.

The connection between freedom and health has also been explored from a self-determination perspective. Self-determination theory (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000) articulates how fulfillment of fundamental needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness is essential for volitional endorsement of goal pursuit and subsequent overall well-being. Associated research finds that people are more likely to follow through with health behavior change if they believe they are in control of their own actions. For example, undermining people’s autonomy makes smokers less likely to quit (Curry, Wagner, & Grothaus, 1991). Conversely, people are more likely to adhere to a medical regimen when they feel as though they are acting freely (e.g., Ryan, Plant, & O’Malley, 1995).

Both theories share an underlying emphasis on the perceived locus of causality for the behavior in which the person engages. This raises an interesting issue if those subscribing to religious beliefs attribute responsibility for their health to a higher power. When healthy, this belief can largely be reassuring, as one’s health and well-being is seen as reflecting the love of the divine creator. However, when injured or suffering from a disease, attributions to God can multiply the distress. Consistent with this idea, belief that God is responsible for one’s health has been associated with poorer psychosocial outcomes among patients with rheumatoid arthritis (Wallston et al., 1999) and HIV (Siah & Tan, 2017). Future research might benefit from exploring the conditions under which religion fosters an external locus of health causality that undermines a sense of personal freedom and impacts health.

Offering incentives to participate

There is a considerable literature and strong theoretical base underpinning the issue of incentives for survey participation (Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2009; Sue & Ritter, 2007). Relevant theories are social exchange theory and cognitive dissonance theory. According to social exchange theory, perceived benefits in the form of incentives to participate must outweigh the costs of participation (i.e., the time and effort to complete the survey). Perceived benefits include both material incentives like cash payments, free gifts or prize draws (extrinsic rewards) and intangible ones such as feelings of enjoyment or a sense of social contribution from participating in a worthwhile project (intrinsic rewards). Cognitive dissonance theory helps illuminate social incentives for survey completion. For example, when individuals consider themselves helpful, kind or generous, refusing to participate is incompatible with their self-perception.

Dillman, Smyth and Christian (2009) viewed survey response as a voluntary action within a context of reciprocal social obligations, and showed how survey procedures can build a positive social exchange with prospective survey participants. Their research has demonstrated that a small token incentive given in advance of actual participation in a survey (e.g., $5 mailed with a postal survey) is more likely to elicit a survey response than is a much larger amount promised upon submission of a completed survey; the rationale is that this act creates a sense of reciprocal obligation and builds trust, and trust encourages participation.

Involvement in an activity related to the survey, for example, attending a conference, also increases the likelihood of survey participation (Sue & Ritter, 2007).

4.3.1 Situational determinants of how people defend BJW

In Hafer and Gosse (2010), we discuss a number of potential situational determinants of how people defend BJW in the face of threat. Drawing from equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1976), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and the motivated social cognition literature (Kruglanski, 1996), we organize these variables according to a number of general principles that guide how people pursue their desired ends.

First, strategies that are less effortful or more available will be pursued more than those that are more effortful or less available. Therefore, Hafer and Gosse (2010) suggest that some situational characteristics likely influence the degree to which specific BJW-defense strategies are pursued by affecting perceived effortfulness or availability of strategies. For example, situations can contain cues that a victim is to blame for his or her situation (e.g., Haynes & Olson, 2006). In such a case, blaming the victim requires only moderate cognitive effort and therefore might be employed to a greater extent than other, more effortful ways of maintaining BJW. Additionally, according to justice motive theory, if helping a victim of injustice is unavailable as a means of preserving BJW, then people are more likely to engage in cognitive distortions (Lerner & Miller, 1978).

Second, Hafer and Gosse (2010) suggest that some situational variables affect the degree to which different BJW-defense strategies are employed because these variables influence the perceived effectiveness of the coping mechanisms. For example, people might be more willing to help an innocent victim who represents an isolated case rather than one of many such cases, perhaps because help in the latter situation is viewed as less effective at alleviating injustice (Miller, 1977; see also Kogut, 2011). Similarly, people might be more likely to help if aid is not so personally costly as to make them victims of injustice in the process (see Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002).

Third, people are likely to prefer to attain their desired ends in ways that satisfy multiple motives. According to Hafer and Gosse (2010), therefore, a number of situational variables likely influence the degree to which people pursue particular modes of BJW-defense because these variables determine the extent to which other motives (aside from preserving BJW) are also met. For example, a person who is the perpetrator versus a third-party observer of an injustice might want to maintain BJW while avoiding feelings of guilt or social censure (see Chaikin & Darley, 1973). Derogating the victim of injustice could serve both motives better than some other strategies, such as compensating the victim.

Testing the kinds of situational determinants described in this section requires careful experimental design. Ideally, experiments would include at least the following three elements to test situational predictors of different ways of defending BJW: a manipulation of BJW-threat, measures to test at least two modes of BJW-defense, and a manipulation of a situational variable proposed to determine the degree to which strategy each will be pursued. With these components, one could test, for instance, whether use of one strategy is greater for level 1 of the situational determinant than for level 2, and use of another strategy is greater for level 2 of the situational determinant. To be clear evidence of BJW-defense, this pattern should occur only when threat to BJW is high, not when threat is low. Alternatively, one could test whether one strategy is used more in the high versus low threat condition at level 1 of the situational determinant, whereas another strategy is used more in the high versus low threat condition at level 2 of the situational determinant.

Most studies are unable to test such relations because they do not include all three elements noted in the previous paragraph, although there are a few exceptions (e.g., Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005, Study 1; Warner et al., 2012, Study 4). In one exception, Warner et al. (2012, Study 4) found that the temporal distance of victimization determined the degree to which people endorsed different BJW-defense strategies. When BJW-threat was high, participants who were told the victimization took place in the recent past blamed the victim’s behavior more than did participants told the victimization was in the distant past. To the contrary, participants who were told the victimization took place in the distant past blamed the character of the victim more and saw greater benefits in her suffering than did participants who thought the victimization was in the recent past. The authors interpreted their findings in terms of construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), in that psychologically distant events prompt global judgments (as in character attributions or estimations of benefits), whereas psychologically close events prompt context-specific judgments (like blaming specific behaviors preceding a victimization event). In terms of Hafer and Gosse’s (2010) organization of BJW-defense strategies, Warner et al.’s (2012) temporal distance variable probably influenced endorsement of different strategies through the availability principle. That is, temporal distance might have affected the availability of BJW-defense strategies that required different modes of thinking.

To summarize, many situational variables determine how people defend BJW when confronted with a threatening injustice. These variables likely have their influence through general principles affecting preferences for alternative ways to manage threat. Of course, how people engage in BJW-defense is determined not only by situational characteristics, but also by characteristics of the person. In the following section, we discuss our own research on this topic.

What is having inconsistent thoughts beliefs or attitudes?

What is the term for inconsistency between attitudes and behaviors?

When two of our thoughts or beliefs are inconsistent it is known as?

When our behaviors are inconsistent with our values or beliefs we are not likely to?